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REVIVING THE PUBLIC TRUSTEE CONCEPT AND APPLYING
IT TO INFORMATION PRIVACY POLICY
PRISCILLA M. REGAN*
INTRODUCTION
Three policy narratives in the 1980s and 1990s largely determined the
path that information privacy policy would take. The first was the dominance
of the individual rights definition of the problem of information privacy.
Second was the Reagan administration’s deregulation perspective, which was
followed by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) stepping
back from regulation in the “public interest, convenience and necessity.”
And third was the Clinton administration’s admonition not to stifle
innovation as the Internet developed. All three of these narratives are being
challenged by events in the early part of the twenty-first century. The view
that privacy is not only an individual right, but also a right that is important
to society as a whole, has received more support in policy, philosophical, and
legal literatures—and has called into question the effectiveness and relevance
of policy based on the Fair Information Principles (“FIPs”). At the same
time, the deregulatory policies of the Reagan administration have largely
evolved into new forms of concentration in a number of industries—
including those in the information and communication sectors—and have
raised questions as to whether some of these companies have achieved the
status of providing necessary or essential services and thus should be
regulated. Finally, there is now a question of whether those who benefitted
from the earlier era of free rein are now hampering Internet innovation by
operating to stifle, or buy-up, new startups.
The quest in this Essay is inspired, in large part, by Ithiel de Sola Pool’s
1983 analysis of the convergence of communications technologies, which
had heretofore been regulated under three distinct regimes of print, common
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carriage, and broadcasting. De Sola Pool’s analysis raises the question of
what regime should provide the framework for communications policy of the
future, particularly as applied to Internet communications. For Pool,
The outcome to be feared is that communications in the future may
be unnecessarily regulated under the unfree tradition of law that
has been applied so far to the electronic media. The clash between
the print, common carrier, and broadcast models is likely to be a
vehement communications policy issue in the next decades.
Convergence of modes is upsetting the trifurcated system
developed over the past two hundred years, and questions that had
seemed to be settled centuries ago are being reopened,
unfortunately sometimes not in a libertarian way.1
Pool’s primary concern was that speech remain free and unfettered from
regulation in the new electronic era, as was truest under the print regime.
Arguably, speech has remained generally free on the Internet and in
electronic communications, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s holding
that the provisions of the Communications Decency Act designed to censor
Internet material violated the First Amendment freedom of speech.2 And,
arguably, commercial speech has been somewhat privileged, especially
online advertisements and targeted messages to consumers—with the effect
that the privacy of consumers has been compromised. Although the conflict
between free speech and privacy is not the focus of my analysis, it is
instructive to note that this perceived conflict established an early line of
policy discourse and provided legal, and even constitutional, rationales
against strong information privacy policy and, in effect, may have closed off
a path to a different approach to information privacy protection.3
1. ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 7–8 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864–85 (1997); Ira Glasser, The Struggle for a
New Paradigm: Protecting Free Speech and Privacy in the Virtual World of Cyberspace, 23 NOVA
L. REV. 627, 646 (1999).
3. Eugene Volokh voiced the concern that information privacy protections would endanger
free speech by restricting the ability of others to communicate information about us and that free
speech was the higher value to protect. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1049, 1123–24 (2000). Both Paul Schwartz and Julie Cohen provided important and
insightful responses to Volokh’s analysis. Schwartz emphasizes that FIPs that require nondisclosure of information “help maintain the boundary between public discourse and the other
realms of communication” and “safeguard deliberative democracy by shaping the terms of
individual participation in social and political life.” Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information
Privacy: Eugene Volokh’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1563–64
(2000). Cohen, in turn, argues, “[i]n the sense that counts for First Amendment purposes,
personally-identified data is not collected, used or sold for its expressive content at all; it is a tool
for processing people, not a vehicle for injecting communication into the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1373, 1414 (2000) (citing Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99 (2000)).
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This Essay proceeds in four parts: First, this Essay provides a brief
review of information privacy policy and practices and their relevance and
effectiveness in today’s information environment (such as big data, the
Internet of Things, individual convenience compromising public
convenience). Second, the Essay analyzes communications deregulation to
identify key principles and to determine whether these are relevant to today’s
environment. Third, this Essay examines the current status of the Internet
landscape; and fourth, provides a preliminary investigation of whether and
how the public trustee concept might be applied to information privacy
policy.
I. INFORMATION PRIVACY POLICY AND PRACTICES
The shortcomings of the current approach to information privacy law in
the United States are generally and broadly recognized.4 The current model,
based on the FIPs, places the burden on individuals to monitor organizations
in order to ensure that their information is accurate, complete, and used only
for the purposes to which the individual has agreed. Although organizations
are to give notice of their practices, such notice is often in the form of long,
lawyerly statements that few read in either online or offline forms.5 Updating
or replacing FIPs has received renewed attention as information practices
move from individual records to big data analytics. Additionally, there is
increased recognition that privacy is not just important to the individual but

4. See, e.g., Robert M. Gellman, Fragmented, Incomplete, and Discontinuous: The Failure
of Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and Institutions, 6 SOFTWARE L.J. 199 (1993); Paul M.
Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815 (2000); Daniel J. Solove,
Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880
(2013); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal
Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033 (1999).
5. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Notices, 4
ISJLP 543 (2008). In their research, McDonald and Cranor found that the national opportunity cost
for the time to read privacy policies is in the order of $781 billion, or seventy-six work days a year,
given that the average American encounters almost 1,500 privacy notices a year. See id. at 552–65;
Alexis C. Madrigal, Reading the Privacy Policies You Encounter in a Year Would Take 76 Work
Days, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/readingthe-privacy-policies-you-encounter-in-a-year-would-take-76-work-days/253851/.

1028

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 76:1025

also is important to society more generally6 and takes on some of the
characteristics of a public good.7
The modern personal information economy has revealed the weaknesses
of looking at privacy as a private good, or individual value, for which isolated
individuals can bargain and negotiate to obtain the level of privacy protection
that they desire. Instead, the information asymmetries of the personal
information market, as well as the actions of other individuals, render it
impossible for individuals either to procure reliable and complete
information on the implications of revealing their information or to ensure
that the actions of others will not implicate their privacy. On social
networking sites, one’s own privacy is dependent upon one’s friends, friends
of friends, professional colleagues, affinity sets, and others who have access
to that individual’s personal information. The actions of one person affect
the privacy of others in that group.8 The other way in which users expose
data about one another is more complicated and less directly attributable to
the actions of others with whom one actually interacts.9 This is the landscape
of big data where “individuals cannot know what the data they reveal means
when aggregated with billions of other data points.”10 Ira Rubinstein notes
that the information extracted from big data “is not only unintuitive and
unpredictable, but also results from a fairly opaque process.”11
Recently, a number of scholars have begun rethinking how the current
status of personal privacy might best be conceptualized in a way that moves
6. Chapter 8 of my 1995 book, Legislating Privacy, set out one of the earliest arguments for
the social importance of privacy and suggested three bases for its social importance: privacy’s
common value, its public value and its collective value. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING
PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 213 (1995). A number of scholars
have also recognized and further developed the social importance of privacy: Valerie Steeves, Helen
Nissenbaum, Paul Schwartz, Beate Roessler, Paul Ohm, Daniel Solove. For the most recent writing
on this, see SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Beate Roessler
& Dorota Mokrosinska eds., 2015).
7. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385
(2015); see also Dennis D. Hirsch, Privacy, Public Goods, and the Tragedy of the Trust Commons:
A Response to Professors Fairfield and Engel, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 67 (2016); Priscilla M. Regan,
Response to Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 51 (2016).
8. Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and Externalities, 6
ISJLP 425, 428–29 (2011).
9. See also Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run Around Anonymity and
Consent, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 44
(Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014); Paul Ohm, Changing the Rules: General Principles for Data Use and
Analysis, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 96
(Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014); Priscilla M. Regan, Big Data and Privacy, in ANALYTICS, POLICY
AND GOVERNANCE 204 (Jennifer Bachner et al. eds., 2017).
10. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 7, at 390.
11. Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA
PRIVACY L. 74, 76 (2013).
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beyond the individual rights and FIPs approach. A central component of this
rethinking is to realistically examine the economics or market context in
which personal privacy is negotiated, which logically and inevitably draws
attention to the market failures, making it difficult, if not impossible, for
individuals to protect their own privacy.12 These market failures include, for
example, the asymmetries in information about the flows of personal
information, lack of transparency regarding data exchanges, and lack of
knowledge about short-term and long-term implications and costs to the
individual. The existence of such market failures, joined with the recognition
of a social or public value of privacy, justifies thinking about privacy as a
public good.
Scholars are currently pursuing at least four lines of analysis to
conceptualize privacy as containing a collective or public good value and a
different approach to protecting privacy. The first is to stress the negative
externalities that result from the way that personal information is currently
collected, used, and exchanged, and thus, explore how the tools and practices
of environmental protection might be incorporated into personal information
protection.13 The second is to view the personal information landscape as
experiencing a “tragedy of the commons.” I have argued elsewhere that
personal information can be viewed as a “common-pool resource,”14 whose
value to any one user is curtailed by other users because the common pool
resource system is overloaded in that the collection of more personal
information drives up the costs to both data subjects and users; polluted in
that inaccurate, irrelevant, and out-of-date information contaminates the
resource pools; and over-harvested in that more users take similar pieces of
information from the pool, reducing the unique value of that information for
any one user.15 Somewhat similarly, the third way of conceptualizing a
public good value of privacy is to draw attention to how the personal
information landscape has resulted in the “tragedy of the trust commons.”16
Finally, the fourth is to use tools and analysis from behavioral and
experimental economics to identify the negative externalities or spillovers

12. See, e.g., Fairfield & Engel, supra note 7; A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass
Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1713; Hirsch, supra note 7; Regan, supra note 7.
13. Froomkin, supra note 12; Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What
Privacy Regulation Can Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2006).
14. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30 (1990).
15. Priscilla M. Regan, Privacy as a Common Good in the Digital World, 5 INFO. COMM. &
SOC’Y 382, 400 (2002).
16. Hirsch, supra note 13, at 29–30.
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that individuals create in their own actions and to empower groups to protect
privacy.17
Given the weaknesses of the current regulatory or, more accurately, selfregulatory, approach and the increasing appreciation for privacy’s social
importance, serious thinking about an appropriate public policy approach that
recognizes the broad social value of information privacy is needed. I propose
that the old model of public trustee, as applied, for example, to Ma Bell in
the Communications Act of 1934 and as found in notions of fiduciary
responsibility, is likely to be relevant again in today’s personal information
environment with large, concentrated firms providing multifaceted and
interlocking services for individuals and organizations.
II. LOGIC OF COMMUNICATIONS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION
Although a detailed review and analysis of the history of
communications and telecommunications policy is far beyond the scope of
this Essay, it is instructive to consider the traditional principles that guided
policy in this area—and the logic for changing those principles in the mid1980s. Such a review will reveal whether and, if so, which principles may
be relevant in today’s Internet environment.
From the Radio Act of 1927 until the deregulatory wave of the 1980s,
broadcasting regulation under both the Federal Radio Commission (“FRC”)
and the FCC was based on the standard of the “public interest, convenience,
and necessity.”18 Although the vagueness of this standard was recognized at
the time, the general idea was to establish the fundamental principle that
would help guide the development of the industry in an area where
technology was likely to change and evolve.19 As an author of the Radio Act
of 1927 stated at the time:
[I]n the present state of scientific development . . . licenses should
be issued only to those stations whose operation would render a
benefit to the public, are necessary in the public interest, or would
contribute to the development of the art. . . . [T]he broadcasting

17. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 7.
18. See generally Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins
and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at
3, 14 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989).
19. Id. at 18.
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privilege will not be a right of selfishness. It will rest upon an
assurance of public interest to be served.20
The Act borrowed from the public utility model of regulation and
characterized broadcasters as “‘public trustees’ who were ‘privileged’ to use
a scarce public resource”—the public airwaves and the broadcast spectrum.21
The emphasis was that licensed broadcasters had, in effect, “social
responsibilities.”22 The overall goal was to ensure that “the interest, the
convenience, and the necessity of the listening public,” and not that of “the
individual broadcaster or the advertiser,” was “first and foremost.”23 We will
return to these principles in the final part of the Essay but first need to briefly
examine how they played out over time.
In the late 1970s and continuing in the 1980s, under Chairman Mark
Fowler, the FCC began to revisit the traditional interpretation of the public
interest with respect to the communications industry and to emphasize that
regulation was only necessary “when the marketplace clearly fails to protect
the public interest, but not when there is only a potential for failure.”24 At
this time, the FCC set a higher threshold for regulation, reasoning that the
increase in the number of broadcasting stations and other communications
providers nullified the scarcity of the airwaves rationale for regulation. What
the FCC saw instead was that particular stations were meeting the needs of
particular segments of the public, and thus there was less need for one station
to serve the interests of all listeners or viewers.25 Additionally, the FCC
believed that the public service role was part of broadcasters’ culture and that
the audience would demand that broadcasters serve the public,26 which also
lessened the need and rationale for government regulation. Democratic
members of Congress, such as Edward Markey (D-MA) and John Dingell
(D-MI), disagreed with the FCC’s deregulatory moves, retaining the
perspective that broadcasters were “licensees and trustees of the public
airwaves” who should serve the public interest and that the market was not
able to compel broadcasters to carry out these responsibilities.27

20. Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest” Standard: The Search for
the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 609 (1998) (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 5479 (1926)
(statement of Rep. White)).
21. Id. at 610.
22. Id. at 626.
23. Id. at 611 (quoting FED. RADIO COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 166 (1928)).
24. Id. at 616.
25. Id. at 632.
26. Id.
27. Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 145, 150 (1993) (citing Straight Talk from Chairman Dingell, BROADCASTING, Feb. 16,
1987, at 31).
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Telecommunications also experienced a deregulatory wave in the
1980s. Nicholas Economides recounts that, historically, regulation,
predominantly in the guise of anti-trust regulations, was seen as appropriate
in the telecommunications sector for four reasons: the market could not bring
about competitive outcomes; deviation from economic efficiency was
socially desirable; social and private benefits were distinct; and there was a
need to coordinate technical standards.28 The 1934 Telecommunications Act
laid the groundwork for federal regulation and established the FCC’s
jurisdiction over telecommunications as a common carrier service.29 Until
1981, AT&T dominated all aspects of US telecommunications—local and
long-distance lines and revenue, equipment (Western Electric), and research
(Bell Labs)—and achieved near monopoly status.30 Although the public
interest objective was somewhat vague, regulators agreed that basic local
phone service or “universal service” was desirable and even necessary from
a public interest perspective.31 By the 1970s, more than ninety percent of
U.S. households had telephone service.32 However, the Justice Department
alleged that AT&T and the Bell system acted to limit competition through its
monopoly on equipment, long-distance service, and local service and brought
a major antitrust suit against AT&T in 1974, resulting in a settlement in 1984
in which AT&T retained the long-distance network and divested itself of
seven regional telephone companies.33 This settlement recognized that local
telecommunications services had the characteristics of a natural monopoly
while competition would likely flourish in long distance services.34
The story of telecommunications deregulation is fascinating but far too
complex and intricate to convey in depth here. It is relevant to examine the
trajectory of public interest concepts, however, so a brief overview is
appropriate. The 1996 Telecommunications Act attempted to restructure the
28. Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction, in THE LIMITS
R. Nelson ed., 2005).
29. Robinson, supra note 18, at 3, 18. The term “common carrier” has a long legal history
dating back to Roman law and English common law with the intent of conveying that a service was
open to the general public without discrimination. Title II of the Communications Act of 1934
regulated telecommunications services as common carriers. Eli Noam identified “the following
factors are important in determining common carriage: [s]ervice is regular[;] [c]ustomers are not
readily predictable and are changeable[;] [t]he carrier solicits business from the general public, for
example by advertising[; and] law and regulations define the responsibilities of the parties.” Eli M.
Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common Carriage, 18 TELECOMM.
POL’Y 435, 437–38 (1994).
30. Economides, supra note 28, at 55.
31. Id. at 51–52.
32. Id. at 54.
33. Id. at 54–55.
34. ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A MORE
COMPETITIVE ERA 8–9 (1991).
OF MARKET ORGANIZATION 48, 50 (Richard
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U.S telecommunications sector and to “preserve and advance universal
service,”35 which included high quality service at low rates, access to
advanced services in all states, rural access, and access to advanced services
for schools, health care facilities, and libraries.36 These goals continue to
guide the expansion of broadband Internet services in the United States37 and
have recently led the FCC to reclassify internet service providers (“ISPs”),
or providers of broadband Internet access service (“BIAS”), as
telecommunications providers.
Previously, ISPs were classified as
“information services” under Title I of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,38
but the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order reclassified them as
telecommunications providers, services, or “common carriers” under Title II
of the Communications Act and Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996.39 This reclassification broadens the FCC’s authority to regulate
certain aspects of the activities of ISPs in the tradition of a responsibility to
operate in the “public interest.”
III. THE LANDSCAPE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY INTERNET
As the Internet began to evolve from a community of researchers to a
global commercial network, the U.S. government made a conscious policy
decision to step back and let it evolve without government regulation. In
outlining the Clinton administration’s position as reflected in the report of
the National Information Infrastructure (“NII”) Task Force, Vice President
Gore provided five principles to guide policy:
 Encourage Private Investment
 Provide and Protect Competition
 Provide Open Access to the Network
 Take Action To Avoid Creating a Society of Information
“Haves” and “Have Nots”
 Encourage Flexible and Responsive Governmental Action40
35. Economides, supra note 28, at 65 (quoting Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)
(2012)).
36. Id.
37. Priscilla M. Regan, Oh What a Tangled Web: Implementation of Broadband Assistance
Grants, in GOVERNING UNDER STRESS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OBAMA’S ECONOMIC
STIMULUS PROGRAM 85, 85 (Timothy J. Conlan et al. eds., 2017).
38. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
39. In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 5601, 2015 WL 1120110
(2015); see also Open Internet, FED. COMM. COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/general/open-internet
(last visited May 17, 2017) (providing background information and documents).
40. Al Gore, U.S. Vice President, Remarks Delivered at the Superhighway Summit (Jan. 11,
1994),
https://clinton1.nara.gov/White_House/EOP/OVP/other/superhig.html;
INFO.
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., THE GLOBAL INFORMATION
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Privacy was one of several topics discussed by the NII Task Force and,
in April 1997, it released an options paper for public comment raising the
question of how best to implement FIPs “that balance the needs of
government, commerce, and individuals, keeping in mind both our interest in
the free flow of information and in the protection of information privacy?”41
The Task Force noted the possibility that “demand could foster a robust,
competitive market for privacy protection. . . . [and] that privacy could
emerge as a market commodity in the Information Age,” but also discussed
the ways in which the government could facilitate the development of a
privacy market and enforce self-regulation, and the possibility of the creation
of a federal privacy entity.42 Based in part on the report of the Task Force,
the Clinton Administration’s Framework for Global Electronic Commerce
concluded: “We believe that private efforts of industry working in
cooperation with consumer groups are preferable to government regulation,
but if effective privacy protection cannot be provided in this way, we will
reevaluate this policy.”43
Since these early discussions, the prevailing policy approach in the
United States has been one of limited government regulation over both
classic market conditions (entry, exit, price) and over privacy protections.
But there is increasing recognition that competition on the Internet has
actually concentrated power in the hands of a few key actors—particularly
ISPs and what are referred to as “edge intermediaries,” such as Facebook and
Google. Likewise, there is increasing recognition that self-regulation has not
effectively protected online privacy and that a privacy market has not
evolved.44 Instead, individuals’ private information has been commodified
and, through online advertising, provides the foundation for “free” websites.
As Frank Pasquale similarly points out:
It would be nice to believe that market forces are in fact
promoting optimal levels of privacy. It would also be comforting

INFRASTRUCTURE: AGENDA FOR COOPERATION (1995), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1995/
global-information-infrastructure-agenda-cooperation.
41. INFO. POLICY COMM., NAT’L INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, OPTIONS FOR
PROMOTING PRIVACY ON THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1997),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/options-promoting-privacy-national-information-infrastructure.
42. Id.
43. THE WHITE HOUSE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE,
https://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html (last visited May 17, 2017) (emphasis
added).
44. See, e.g., Peter Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the
Protection of Personal Information, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION
AGE (U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce ed., 1997), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1997/privacy-and-selfregulation-information-age; Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal
Data Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061 (2009).
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if antitrust law indirectly promoted optimal privacy options by
assuring a diverse range of firms that can compete to supply
privacy at various levels (and in various forms). But this position
is not remotely plausible.45
With respect to large Internet actors, particularly the ISPs but also
Apple, Google, and Facebook, the key policy question is how best to
characterize the roles they currently play. Are these companies, for example,
establishing the infrastructure of modern communication? Are they
providing essential services in conducting modern lives? Do they provide
the foundations over which daily communications and transactions occur?
These questions regarding the implications of the size and scale (global) of
these companies, as well as the pivotal roles they play in modern life, have
generated something of a rethinking of whether free market competition and
a largely hands-off role by government regulators is still appropriate. If the
answers to these questions are affirmative, then some form of government
regulation acknowledging those roles can be justified.
Several privacy scholars have recently begun to engage in analysis of
how these firms and their role in modern economic and social life should be
defined; they more often than not conclude that the role of these firms is
critical and not easily substituted by other companies or actors. Jeffrey
Rosen, for example, points out that “social norms are not something that
Facebook reflects. On the contrary, Google and Facebook have a crucial role
in shaping those social norms.”46 Taking a somewhat different approach,
Pasquale argues that these firms are:
less services than they are platforms for finding services (and,
occasionally, goods). Facebook, Google, and even Internet service
providers (“ISPs”) might be thought of less as sellers of particular
end services than as advisors or gatekeepers, or connectors
between users and what they want. In this intermediary role,
Internet companies are far closer to health insurers or mortgage
brokers than they are to sellers of products or services.47
Deborah Johnson and I similarly raised questions about the status of
both Google and Facebook.48 If Google is a search engine with a mission of
45. Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1009, 1010
(2013).
46. Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of Privacy and Free Speech in the Age of
Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1525, 1535 (2012).
47. Pasquale, supra note 45, at 1015 (footnote omitted) (citing Ioannis Lianos & Evgenia
Motchenkova, Market Dominance and Search Quality in the Search Engine Market, 9 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 419, 421 (2013)).
48. Priscilla M. Regan & Deborah G. Johnson, Policy Options for Reconfiguring the Mirrors,
in TRANSPARENCY AND SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIOTECHNICAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A HOUSE OF
MIRRORS 162, 184 (Deborah G. Johnson & Priscilla M. Regan eds., 2014).
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delivering knowledge (along the lines of a twenty-first century library), then
we might consider Google as something like a public utility or quasi-public
trust. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that, at the same time as
delivering “free” knowledge to its users, Google is also delivering users as
products to its paying customers: advertisers.49 With respect to Facebook,
we asked whether it is “the Ma Bell of the twenty-first century—and should
it be regulated as such? . . . [H]as Facebook become public space, and should
it be regulated in accordance with public trustee principles?”50
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, Paul Ohm cited four justifications for requiring ISPs (BIAS
providers) to provide a higher standard of protection for information privacy:
the history of common carriers’ responsibility “to respect the privacy of the
information they carried”; the “relative lack of choice” consumers have; the
“privileged place” ISPs have in the network (gatekeeper, bottleneck); and the
sensitivity traditionally accorded information such as communications,
reading habits, and location.51 Ohm noted that other online entities
demonstrate some of the same characteristics such as social networking sites
that “carry exceptionally sensitive information and exhibit network effects
and insufficient data portability that limit customer choice and exit.”52
There is some interest on Capitol Hill, in the regulatory agencies, and in
the states in revisiting how to classify these firms and what policy approach
is warranted given their size and scale. Congressional committees held a
number of hearings on a possible antitrust approach to Google in September
2012. In February 2012, thirty-six state attorneys general addressed the
dominant position that Google has in both the search engine and email
environments, and the lack of choice consumers actually have: “It rings
hollow to call their ability to exit the Google products ecosystem a ‘choice’
in an Internet economy where the clear majority of all Internet users use—
and frequently rely on—at least one Google product on a regular basis.”53
49. Id. at 167.
50. Id. at 168–69.
51. How Will the FCC’s Proposed Privacy Regulations Affect Consumers and Competition?
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 114th Cong. 2–5 (2016) (written
statement of Paul Ohm, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center and Faculty Director,
Georgetown Center on Privacy and Technology), http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index
.cfm/hearings?Id=1A0FC3ED-B203-4B2F-8892-DF01C1C7001E&Statement_id=720B518CFB11-4448-9BD6-A072D37B398D.
52. Id. at 9.
53. Rebecca DiLeonardo, State Attorneys General Concerned About Google Privacy Policy,
JURIST: PAPER CHASE (Feb. 23, 2012, 12:25 PM) (citing Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n Attys. Gen.,
Attorneys General Express Concerns Over Google’s Privacy Policy (Feb. 22, 2012)),
http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2012/02/state-attorneys-general-concerned-about-googleprivacy-policy.php.

2017]

REVIVING THE PUBLIC TRUST CONCEPT

1037

Both the FTC and FCC have recently come close to imposing more
regulations on these large actors as illustrated by the FTC’s antitrust
investigations of Google,54 and the FCC’s consideration of whether its net
neutrality rules empowered it to impose requirements on Google, Facebook,
and other Internet companies, as well as ISPs.55 Although neither the FTC
nor the FCC took action against these “edge players,” it is likely that more
such proposals will be made in the near future.
The question now is how best to provide for effective information
privacy protection in this new landscape of the twenty-first century Internet.
Traditional self-regulation with occasional prodding from government
agencies, congressional committees, consumer and privacy groups, and state
attorneys general has yielded not only a patchwork of laws and regulations,
but also an inexplicable morass of confusion for the individual.56
IV. NEW CONCEPTS FOR INFORMATION PRIVACY PROTECTION—PUBLIC
TRUSTEE
In this final Part of the Essay, I will argue that the public trustee
regulatory regime, rather than the anti-trust regime or the environmental
externality regulatory regime, will provide a more robust path to effective
information privacy protection. Three arguments provide the rationale for
this conclusion: First, the large online players are operating at the scope and
scale where “public interest, convenience, and necessity” demand that they
be more regulated. Second, a public trustee approach avoids the somewhat
messy issues of proving “concentration” and anti-competitive behavior
entailed in antitrust regulation. Third, the public trustee approach draws upon
the link between privacy and trust that has emerged from public opinion
surveys and the academic literature on privacy.
The first argument for a public trustee type of regulatory regime entails
a realistic recognition, as noted above, of the size, scale, and influence of
these so-called “edge players.” Evidence for this comes in sheer numbers
alone. Facebook reported in November 2016 that about 1.8 billion people

54. Miguel Helft, Google Confirms F.T.C. Antitrust Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (June 24, 2011,
1:59 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/google-confirms-f-t-c-antitrust-inquiry/?_r
=0.
55. Edward Wyatt, F.C.C., in a Shift, Backs Fast Lanes for Web Traffic, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/24/technology/fcc-new-net-neutrality-rules.html?partner
=socialflow&smid=tw-nytimesbusiness.
56. See Colin J. Bennet, Priscilla M. Regan & Robin M. Bayley, If These Canadians Lived in
the United States, How Would They Protect Their Privacy?, FIRST MONDAY, no. 3, 2017,
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/6817.
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around the world log on to Facebook every month.57 According to a Pew
survey, forty-four percent of adults in the United States report that they get
their news from Facebook.58 The implications of the role of platforms or
edge providers have been most starkly apparent in the recent debates
regarding the role that Facebook and Google played in spreading “fake news”
during the 2016 election. News report after news report59 criticized the
influence these companies had and the fact that that influence was generated
by algorithms that few understand and by a business model that would appear
to enable, if not reward, fake news. Zeynep Tufekci pointed out in an op-ed
in the New York Times that:
Only Facebook has the data that can exactly reveal how fake
news, hoaxes and misinformation spread, how much there is of it,
who creates and who reads it, and how much influence it may have.
Unfortunately, Facebook exercises complete control over access to
this data by independent researchers. It’s as if tobacco companies
controlled access to all medical and hospital records.60
Similarly, Farhad Manjoo wrote: “It’s time to start recognizing that
social networks actually are becoming the world-shattering forces that their
boosters long promised they would be—and to be unnerved, rather than
exhilarated, by the huge social changes they could uncork.”61
To this point, platforms have themselves assumed some responsibility
for policing or controlling the content on their sites. In the mid-2000s, the
deputy general counsel at Google had the authority and responsibility for
determining, both for Google in the United States and Google in other
countries, what content could be displayed and what could not.62 This role,
57. Facebook, Inc. (FB) Q3 2016 Earnings Call, NASDAQ (Nov. 2, 2016, 5:00 PM),
http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/call-transcript.aspx?StoryId=4018524&Title=facebook-fb-q3-2016results-earnings-call-transcript.
58. Jeffrey Gottfried & Elisa Shearer, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016, PEW
RES. CTR. (May 26, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-mediaplatforms-2016/.
59. See, e.g., Caitlin Dewey, Facebook Fake-News Writer: ‘I Think Donald Trump Is in the
White House Because of Me’, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-intersect/wp/2016/11/17/facebook-fake-news-writer-i-think-donald-trump-is-in-thewhite-house-because-of-me/?utm_term=.e4cfdda7ac74; Mike Isaac, Facebook, in Cross Hairs
After Election, Is Said to Question Its Influence, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/14/technology/facebook-is-said-to-question-its-influence-inelection.html; Nick Wingfield et al., Google and Facebook Take Aim at Fake News Sites, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/technology/google-will-banwebsites-that-host-fake-news-from-using-its-ad-service.html?_r=0.
60. Zeynep Tufekci, Opinion, Mark Zuckerberg Is in Denial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/opinion/mark-zuckerberg-is-in-denial.html.
61. Farhad Manjoo, Social Media’s Globe-Shaking Power, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/technology/social-medias-globe-shaking-power.html.
62. Rosen, supra note 46, at 1536.
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referred to as the “Decider,” placed enormous decisionmaking power over
what people around the world would see and not see, and control over when
and how people could speak or when they would be censored. Although this
power was generally used rather wisely at the time, as Jeffrey Rosen argues:
“You might be uncomfortable with the idea of allowing a single woman, a
Decider, to make these incredibly contextual and difficult free speech
decisions for the globe, but the truth is that this Decider model, as inadequate
as it may be, may be better than the alternatives.”63 From a policy options
perspective, the alternatives have not been fully explored yet, for a number
of reasons, the time for exploring options seems to be now.
Both privacy protections and content regulation are central to the
principles of “social responsibility” that underlined the original rationale for
public trustee regulation. The evidence seems to demonstrate that selfregulation and a system of privacy notices does not effectively protect
information privacy. The evidence also seems to show that self-regulation
or no regulation is not effective to ensure content that does not undermine the
integrity of something as fundamental to the democratic process as a
presidential election. Thus, some regulation to ensure that companies serve
the “public interest, convenience and necessity” seems justified.
A second argument for a public trustee type of regulatory regime is that
it avoids the often-messy arguments entailed in antitrust regulation. Such
arguments often get entangled in lengthy court cases and settlements, rely on
detailed and unfathomable financial analyses, and are opaque for the
American public. Beginning in 2010, both the FTC and the European Union
(“EU”) engaged in a number of antitrust investigations, including whether
Google was acting in an anticompetitive manner and prioritizing search
results towards Google-owned companies. Given the difficulties of finding
clear and convincing evidence of discriminatory behavior and practices
towards competitors, and the difficulties of predicting the dynamics of the
innovative information marketplace, antitrust allegations are fraught with
challenges.64
Such challenges played out in the FTC investigation of Google which,
after three years of gathering evidence, holding hearings, and analyzing the
complex record, resulted in some minor concessions on Google’s part but no
formal charges. By 2016, the European Commission had pursued five
different antitrust investigations into Google, three of which resulted in
formal charges. All indications are that the EU will not back off its inquiries
and that countries such as France, where there is litigation over the “right to
63. Id.
64. Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case
Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 209, 184 (2011).
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be forgotten,” and Italy will continue to scrutinize Google’s activities.65 In
mid-2016, the FTC appeared to be considering reopening its investigation as
a result of criticisms that Google is not a neutral gateway to information on
the Internet. At an April 2015 congressional hearing, Senator Richard
Blumenthal (D-Conn.) spoke as follows to the possibility of renewed FTC
investigations: “While the company is a great American success story, their
position in the marketplace has led to legitimate questions about whether they
have used their market power to disadvantage competitors unfairly and
ultimately limit consumer choice.”66
Given the enormous time investment and significant financial and
personnel costs that antitrust investigations entail for both government
regulators and companies such as Google and Facebook, it may be to the
advantage of both to pursue a less adversarial path to resolving these
questions. In this sense, both regulators and companies may prefer to
consider whether a public trustee style regime provides advantages. The
FCC’s recent actions with regard to privacy requirements for ISPs based on
the sensitivity of the information—as well as requirements for transparency,
data security, and data breach notifications—may provide a trial assessment
to see whether an alternative such as this would be more advantageous than
the antitrust route.67 Both Google and Facebook successfully resisted being
included in the FCC’s privacy actions, but depending on how the FCC
regulations play out, it is possible that a change on the companies’ part and/or
on the part of consumer and privacy advocates may result in inclusion of such
edge players.
A third argument for the public trustee approach is that it acknowledges
the importance of the fundamental connection between privacy and trust that
has been demonstrated to be necessary in the information economy and
Internet landscape more generally. Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog
make an interesting argument, consistent with my proposal here, to refocus
privacy from a protection against bad things to an enabler of trust
relationships, which would benefit both data subjects and data holder.68 They
apply the principle of “fiduciary duties” in much the way that I am thinking
65. Natalia Drozdiak & Sam Schechner, EU Files Additional Formal Charges Against Google,
ST.
J.,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-set-to-face-more-eu-antitrust-chargesWALL
1468479516 (last updated July 14, 2016).
66. Nancy Scola, Sources: Feds Taking Second Look at Google Search, POLITICO (May 11,
2016, 2:38 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/federal-trade-commission-google-searchquestions-223078.
67. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Adopts Broadband Privacy Rules to Give
Broadband Consumers Increased Choice, Transparency and Security for Their Personal Data (Oct.
27, 2016), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-broadband-consumer-privacy-rules.
68. Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016).
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of public trustee in that they would similarly move privacy principles “from
procedural means of compliance for data extraction towards substantive
principles to build trusted, sustainable information relationships.”69 As they
convincingly point out:
Rather than encouraging trust, modern American privacy law
encourages companies to profit in short-sighted ways by extracting
as much value as possible from personal data in the short term. As
long as companies don’t cause a narrow set of legally recognized,
largely financial harms, they are essentially free to set up the terms
of information relationships any way they wish.70
Public opinion surveys from the 1980s onwards reveal that the public
does not trust organizations “to collect and use information about people like
you in a responsible way,” with the lowest levels of trust in sectors that
Americans associate with data collection and monitoring.71 Such trust is not
only important to individuals who are data subjects but also to the
organizations collecting this information and is critical to both overall trust
in government and trust in the digital economy. As Hirsch points out:
Overall user trust in the digital economy is not only a vital
resource; it is also an open-access, partially rivalrous one. No one
can fence it off. Particular companies may enhance, or deplete,
overall user trust in society. . . . But, in the absence of laws or other
forms of social control, [particular companies] cannot prevent
others from dipping into the well of overall user trust, or from
diminishing it through abusive behaviors.72
The asymmetries in the data subject-data holder dynamic and the
essential role that trust plays in this relationship have long been recognized,
have gotten worse over time, and need to be readdressed. In analyses of a
number of complex systems designed for purposes of surveillance or
transparency, we found, “trust relationships are often ill defined or
incompletely understood and trust is often compromised . . . . The individual
becomes caught in a web of cascading mirrors, sending her into relationships

69. Id. at 431–32.
70. Id. at 434.
71. REGAN, supra note 6, at 65. Such questions were asked in a series of Louis Harris and
Associates and Alan F. Westin opinion polls in the 1980s–1990s and more recently in a series of
Pew Research opinion polls. See, e.g., id. at 50–60 (discussing surveys); MARY MADDEN & LEE
RAINIE, PEW RES. CTR., AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES ABOUT PRIVACY, SECURITY AND
SURVEILLANCE
(2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-aboutprivacy-security-and-surveillance/; Lee Rainie, The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America,
PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-ofprivacy-in-america/.
72. Hirsch, supra note 7, at 84.
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over which she has no control, no expectations, and no basis of trust.”73 With
an emphasis on data holders as public trustee, a concern with identifying and
justifying “privacy harms” would not be part of policy discussions, as also
pointed out by Richards and Hartzog.74 Rather than focusing on the negative
effects of information collection and use, policy discussions would shift
attention to determining what kinds of information practices serve a public
interest in an information economy.
Finally, I will consider some of the implications of an information
privacy regulatory regime based on public trustee principles of “public
interest, convenience and necessity.” As noted above, the current privacy
protection regime based on the FIPs and self-regulation overburdens the
individual with tasks that are unrealistic, resulting in a system that is
ineffective, causes cynicism and frustration among individuals, requires
episodic prodding by federal regulators with inadequate power, and
oftentimes leaves companies in a defensive and uncertain position. Under
such circumstances, no one wins—not the individual, not the government,
and not the companies. At the same time, further analysis of the personal
information environment leads many to conclude that information privacy
actually has many of the characteristics of a public good, which provides a
rationale for rethinking a public trustee approach for protecting information
privacy. So how might this play out?
First, it is important to recognize that, to some extent, such a shift
actually entails something of a rethinking of Internet governance more
generally. The development of the Internet has been something of a work in
progress—without top-down planning and largely dependent on cooperative
arrangements among self-identified affected private and public parties. The
principles and regulations guiding this organic development have largely
emerged through the process of development—first, by primarily addressing
administrative (such as, system of domain names) and technical (such as,
interoperability) concerns. More social principles were regarded as unwise
and irrelevant, as perhaps best articulated in John Perry Barlow’s A
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, which says to the
governments of the world:
We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and the
commonweal, our governance will emerge. Our identities may be
distributed across many of your jurisdictions. The only law that all

73. Priscilla M. Regan, Trust in a House of Mirrors?, in TRANSPARENCY AND SURVEILLANCE
AS SOCIOTECHNICAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A HOUSE OF MIRRORS 146, 159 (Deborah G. Johnson &
Priscilla M. Regan eds., 2014). The systems examined include: Campaign Finance Disclosure,
Secure Flight, American Red Cross, Google and Facebook. Id.
74. Richards & Hartzog, supra note 68, at 459.
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our constituent cultures would generally recognize is the Golden
Rule. We hope we will be able to build our particular solutions on
that basis. But we cannot accept the solutions you are attempting
to impose.75
The reality that evolved over the twenty years since this was written is
quite different than what the pioneers of Cyberspace envisioned. Rather than
a parallel universe for virtual communities providing more freedom and
creativity than the physical world, Cyberspace has developed as an adjunct
of the physical world dominated and organized by the same large
organizations that exist in that world.
Second, perhaps more appropriately termed “hopefully,” the process of
formulating information privacy policies—as well as those for free content
regulation and law enforcement or intelligence access—would be less
adversarial under a public trustee regime. Rather than long drawn out
lawsuits with zero-sum stakes, a focus on the social responsibility of large
Internet players might redirect attention from particular, competing
stakeholder interests to the broader common or shared interests of all parties.
To a certain extent, the development and roles of privacy officers76 in private
and public organizations illustrate the type of dynamic that might emerge
under a public trustee regime—but with their role elevated and substantiated
by government sanctions and oversight in a more cooperative corporatist
process than either self-regulation or government regulation entail. How this
might develop will require more research and analysis, but seems to be a path
worth pursuing.

75. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
76. KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND:
DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (2015).

